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Abstract—One of the major concerns when moving to Clouds
is data confidentiality. Nevertheless, more and more applications
are outsourced to a public or private Cloud. In general, the
usage of virtualization is acknowledged as an isolation mechanism
between applications running on shared resources. But, as previ-
ously shown, virtualization does not ensure data security. Indeed,
the isolation can be broken due to covert channels existing in
both the software and the hardware (e.g., improperly virtualized
caches). Furthermore, even if a perfect control mechanism could
be design, it would not protect against covert channels as they
bypass control mechanism using legal means.
In this paper, we first describe how these attacks are working.
Next, after presenting the existing mitigation mechanisms, we
show that a good solution is to take into account security while
allocating resources (i.e., when placing the VMs). Furthermore,
depending on which resources are shared, we demonstrate that
the achievable bitrate of these attacks can change dramatically.
We propose a new metric to quantify them and use it as an
acceptable risk for isolation properties. Then, we show how to
use them when allocating resources and the importance of a fine-
grained resource allocation mechanism. Finally, we demonstrate
that a security-oblivious placement algorithm breaks a fair
amount of properties but taking into account the isolation impacts
the acceptance rate (i.e., the percentage of successfully placed
VMs).
Keywords—Security; Cloud; Virtual Machine Placement; Iso-
lation; Microarchitecture; Covert channels;
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is one of the biggest concern for the massive adop-
tion of Clouds [6]. Indeed, multitenancy and shared resources
facilitate attacks and thefts by altering the level of isolation
between tenants, processes or Virtual Machines (VMs). While
virtualization could be seen as an isolation mechanism between
tenants, it is not the case [14]. Accordingly, it is required to
have another control mechanism to enforce the isolation.
Furthermore, the security of a system is as strong
as the weakest link. And, even with a perfect informa-
tion flow (or access) control mechanism at the system
level (e.g., Hypervisor/Operating system), information can be
silently leaked out (or accessed) by exploiting (unwillingly)
unsecure design or implementation; this is called covert
channels. The literature exhibits multiple covert channels at-
tacks that have been successfully conducted in Cloud envi-
ronments [14], [21], [22] (e.g., EC2) thanks to the shared
hardware components between an attacker and a victim.
Previous works opt for different approaches to tackle this
issue: detection of attacks, fine-grained tracking of resources
usage and placement algorithms. Placement algorithms under
collocation/anti-collocation constraints specify if 2 VMs can
share the same Physical Machine (PM) or not. Accordingly,
they do not take into account any scenarios where sharing
resources is reasonable when measuring information leakage.
In this paper, we propose a new resource allocation mech-
anism under information leakage constraints. Our mechanism
takes into account microarchitectural components as they are
one of the main reasons of covert channels. Moreover, it allows
to have a more fine-grained allocation and thus reduces the
quantity of resources wasted due to security constraints. But
first, we need a way to present the quantity of information
that can be leaked between 2 applications. Our allocation
algorithm can be based on any covert-channel metric but due
to the lack of proper metric, we propose a new information
leakage metric that can be easily used by a tenant and is both
application and hardware independent. This metric quantifies
information leakage through microarchitectural covert chan-
nels based on the achievable bitrate between 2 applications.
Using this metric, a tenant can express its isolation properties
and specify the acceptable leakage that fits his security needs.
For example, banks, governments and medical establishments
usually require more secure setups than research institutes
running experiments. Using the application model (a set of
VMs) and our metric, we propose our new resource allocation
mechanism. Furthermore, we present how we have tackled
the specificity of NUMA (Non-Uniform Memory Access)
allocation policies to encompass both traditional and modern
architectures, and proposed a model for our algorithm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II motivates our
work by presenting related works on covert channel metrics
and security-aware placement algorithms. We explain our new
information leakage metric in Section III. Section IV details
our placement algorithm including our NUMA allocation
model. In section V, after presenting our evaluation environ-
ment and scenarios, we evaluate our security-aware algorithm
against a security-oblivious one. Section VI concludes this
paper and presents our future work.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we present the background and motivation
of our work. First, we do a quick introduction of microarchitec-
ture of multi-core processors and of the security and isolation
issues in Clouds. Then we explain how to break isolation and
the mitigation techniques against these attacks. Finally, we
present existing metrics that quantify the quality of isolation.
A. Microarchitectural components
Since the last few years, the complexity of physical ma-
chines’ hardware topology has increased dramatically [2]. The
number of cores, shared caches, and memory nodes have
completely changed the microarchitecture of computers. With
the increasing number of cores, scalability becomes a major
issue. Modern processors use non-uniform interconnects to
address it. This technology is named Non-Uniform Memory
Access (NUMA) architectures. For example, Figure 1 shows
the inner architectural components of 3 modern platforms. As
NUMA architectures impacts the memory hierarchy model, a
traditional x86 architecture can be viewed as a single NUMA
with local accesses. Therefore, we encompass most legacy and
modern systems by considering the NUMA model.
Fig. 1. Interconnection of processors (P), memory (M) and I/O chipsets in
some modern architectures: (a) and (b) 2 Intel Westmere-EP processors; (c) 4
Intel Nehalem-EX processors.
B. Security and Isolation in Clouds
Security is a major issue in Clouds [6], in particular public
Clouds. Ristenpart et al. [14] discuss multiple approaches
to exploit this co-residency in Clouds such as Cross-VM
performance degradation, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks or
stealing cryptographic keys, thus demonstrating the reality of
security threats. They have shown the feasibility of collocating
their VMs on the same physical machine as business targets in
EC2. From this work, it is clear that virtualization is far from
being sufficient to have a secure Cloud.
The major problem of virtualization is a weak isolation.
In security, isolation is defined as the composition of the
confidentiality and integrity properties where:
• Confidentiality is the absence of unauthorized disclo-
sure of information.
• Integrity is the absence of unauthorized system alter-
ation.
As a result, isolation is the absence of unauthorized dis-
closure and alteration of information.
In this paper, we focus on the isolation problem of VMs
sharing the same hardware and hypervisor. Furthermore, we
will not consider performance interference. Indeed, it does not
allow information modification or leak even if it is due to
improper isolation [18].
C. Micro-Architectural Timing Covert channels
Cloud providers can provide a large range of security
mechanisms to prevent unauthorized information flows. But,
despite all the effort, there is still a potential risk of data
leakage in the Cloud, that is covert channels.
A covert channel is an attack which bypasses the control
mechanism using legal means to leak information to unautho-
rized neighbors. A covert channel breaks the confidentiality
property and thus, the isolation property. Therefore, even a
perfect control mechanism is useless against covert channels.
Covert channels should not be confused with side channels.
A covert channel exists when 2 cooperative entities, let say
Trojan and Spy, use a common protocol to communicate or
exfiltrate information. For a side channel, only one process,
the Spy, collects unwillingly disclosed information. Because
the leaking process can be considered as an unintentional
Trojan, we argue that side channels are special cases of covert
channels. Recent exploits (e.g., Heartblead, Ghost) have shown
the easiness of remotly uploading and executing a malicious
code.
Covert channels are categorized in covert storage channels
and covert timing channels.
A covert storage channel exploits a standard data channel to
encodes secret information. This problem has been described
in 1983 by G. Simmons [15] as the prisoner’s problem. This at-
tack is popular for network protocols, for example by using the
reserved or unused bits of a frame to convey information. As
covert-storage channels are not due to hardware components
but software design, we will focus mainly on covert timing
channels.
A covert timing channel exploits access timings of shared
resources. In his work [12], C. Percival took advantage of
cache hit and miss to convey “0” and “1” respectively. With
collocated VMs sharing multiple resources (hardware and sys-
tem), the Cloud is an environment conducive for such exploits.
Building a covert timing channel in a public commercial Cloud
(e.g., EC2) has been proven feasible [14], [21], [22]. A reliable
bandwidth of just a hundred bits per second is enough to
silently extract hundreds of 1024-bytes private keys, or tens
of thousands of credit cards in a day. The DoD guideline [17]
(TCSEC / Orange Book) characterizes a covert channel by its
bitrate and error rate. It suggests that covert channels exceeding
a threshold of 0.1 bit per second should be audited and be of
concern to security if it performs over 1 bit per second.
In a Cloud environment, covert timing channels can be
conducted using several hardware or system components. In
Table I, we draw a summary of previous Cloud covert timing
channels works. For the same component, reported bitrates can
differ up to 6 orders of magnitude (e.g., 0.2 bps and 190.4 kbps
for L2 cache covert channel) depending on the experimental
environment (i.e., setup column). This gap cannot be explained
by hardware differences alone (e.g., CPU clock speed, cache
size). How the attack is implemented also has a major impact
on the bitrate.
D. Mitigation techniques
Covert channels in multitenant environments pose a real
threat with bitrates largely over the 1 bit per second standard
TABLE I. COVERT-TIMING CHANNELS SUMMARY FOR CLOUD
ENVIRONMENTS
Paper Component Bitrate Setup
[12] L1 3.2 Mbps Lab
L2 800 kbps Lab
[19] SMT/FU 500 kbps Lab
Speculation 200 kbps Lab
[22] L2 262.47 bps Lab
L2 3.75 bps EC2
[21] Memory bus 746.8 bps Lab
Memory bus 107.9 bps EC2
L2 190.4 kbps Lab
[11] CPU 0.49 bps Lab
[20] Xen Shared-Mem 174.98 bps Lab
[14] Memory bus 0.006 bps EC2
Hard disk 0.0005 bps EC2
L2 0.2 bps EC2
threshold. A covert channel is by definition a reliable data
channel, therefore reducing the bandwidth, preventing the
channel from being reliable (i.e., increasing the error rate)
or removing the channel are the basic ideas for mitigation
techniques.
We discuss below the mitigation possibilities given 3
perspectives: the tenant, the Cloud provider and the hardware
manufacturer.
1) Tenant: The tenant has limited possibilities against
covert channels. HomeAlone [24] is a detection approach to
detect unusual L2 cache usage without relying on hardware
support nor hypervisor modification. But HomeAlone’s oracle
is not perfect and the Spy can try to evade the detection.
Moreover, according to Wu et al. [21], for memory bus
covert timing channels, this approach would be subject to
high performance overhead and high false positive rate due
to non-determinism and higher access latencies. To sum up,
a detection approach at the tenant level cannot be generalized
and do not apply to yet to discover covert timing channels.
2) Cloud provider: On the other side, the Cloud provider
has more latitude to mitigate covert channels. He can use
detection techniques at the hypervisor level with lower over-
head. Moreover, he can modify the scheduling policy to
implement cache partitioning or page coloring to isolate
cache/memory accesses [13], [16] at the cost of performance.
Others existing preventive approaches are dedicated instances
or collocation/anti-collocation placement. In this case, the
isolation properties can be modelized as collocation and anti-
collocation constraints [3], [7]. Nevertheless, they require to
express the list of tenants with whom each VM is allowed to
share resources (or not). Moreover such measures are costly
for the tenant as he pays extra charges for dedicated physi-
cal machines as these approaches use coarse grain resource
allocation model.
On modern public Clouds such as Amazon EC2 and
Microsoft Azure, hardware multithreading called simultaneous
multithreading (SMT) is disabled as cache-based covert chan-
nels attacks are easy to build. For example, L1 caches that
are dedicated to one core are the easiest way to create covert
channels [12] between VMs. The NoHype concept [8] consists
in removing the virtualization layer while retaining the key
features enabled by virtualization. They limit covert channel
by enabling one VM per core but as we have shown, other
covert channels exist within the microarchitecture components.
3) Hardware manufacturer: A covert channel is based on
a faulty implementation. Thus, the hardware design is the
initial reason of most covert channels. The solution would
be to integrate security concerns when designing hardware
components. Needless to say, it will not fix the issues on
hardware already in production. Nevertheless, hardware design
is out of the scope of this paper.
4) Summary: Because of the lack of near-future improve-
ment in hardware design and the specificity of detection
techniques, we propose a covert channel aware placement
solution. Outsourced applications do not have the same level of
criticality. For example, a private individual’s web site is less
threatened by covert channels than a banking or government
application. Therefore, we consider the tenant to be responsible
for specifying an acceptable information leakage risk and
then, the Cloud provider has automated procedures to decide
whether or not the tenant’s VM should share L1/L2/L3 caches,
memory bus, etc. with other VMs. Such solution can be applied
to any Cloud and easily enriched with newly discovered covert
channel attacks. The placement algorithm has to use a general
metric to deduce a value from a given placement/hardware con-
figuration and compare it with the tenant’s risk requirement.
The following part discusses existing metrics and devises a
new metric to tackle practicability issues.
E. Covert channel aware metric
Due to the recentness of Cloud (and virtualization) covert
channels works, the literature is quite poor in covert channel
metric propositions. Published in 2012 and after, the reference
works are the metrics proposed by Demme J. et al. [5]
and Zhang T. et al. [23] with respectively the Side chan-
nel Vulnerability Factor (SVF) and the Cache Side channel
Vulnerability (CSV). Firstly, both metrics are design for side
channels and not covert channels, but because side channels
and covert channels are intrinsically related, theses metrics
cannot be discard based on this sole argument to motive our
new information leakage metric.
SVF and CSV are float values between 0 and 1 reflecting
the degree of information leakage an observer can see from
an execution. They correlate the oracle execution traces with
the leaked execution traces viewed by another process in
terms of cache accesses, cpu loads, etc. The approach is thus
hardware-independent but the obtained value is application-
specific. Indeed, the evaluation is based on the execution of a
cryptographic library and it is hard to deduce if a given value
would be roughly the same for an arbitrary application.
One problematic is to allow a tenant to specify a value
as an acceptable risk. Because SVF and CSV are correlation
factors, they can be easily used for comparison but except
for limit values (0 and 1) it is quite a challenge to give a
practical meaning to an intermediate value (e.g., 0.467), even
for a knowledgable tenant.
Therefore, both SVF and CSV are unspecifiable in practice,
and thus we must come up with an alternative covert channel
aware metric presented thereafter.
III. INFORMATION LEAKAGE METRIC : A
MICRO-ARCHITECTURAL SECURITY METRIC
We have shown in Section II that both SVF and CSV
metrics are not satisfying. Because the DoD guideline [17]
(TCSEC / Orange Book) indicates that a covert channel
(characterized by its bitrate and error rate) over 1 bit per second
(bps) should be of concern to security, we use it as a reference
value for our metric.
Therefore, we define the Information Leakage Metric as
follows :
Definition 1 (Information Leakage Metric): Ratio
between the covert channel theoretical bitrate in a noiseless
environment and the reference value (1 bps).
Unlike SVF and CSV, our metric characterizes the worst case
scenario. In a security context, such scenario corresponds
to the maximal bitrate a covert channel can theoretically
achieve. Thus, to compute this value, we consider a noiseless
environment and a parallel setup (the Trojan and the Spy run
on distinct cores). Because our Information Leakage approach
is based on a core characteristic (i.e., the bitrate), a value exists
for any timing covert channel though it can be complex to
compute it.
In the following, we exemplify the approach with a cache-
based timing covert channel.
A. Cache-based Timing Covert channels bitrate in Virtualized
Environment
In this subsection, we detail how a cache-based timing
covert channels works using Percival et al. technique [12].
The idea is to time the latency of accessing memory
addresses. We distinguish two cases, that is, if the accessed
data are already in the cache, then the latency is small; else it
must be retrieved from the main memory, then the latency is
larger. As illustrated in Figure 2, the Spy accesses twice a set
of cache lines (by accessing memory addresses mapped to it).
When the data is in the cache, the latency is under a threshold
and so the Spy reads bit “0”, otherwise it reads bit “1”. Its
data are now in the cache.
Similarly, to transmit bit “1”, the Trojan accesses the same
set of cache lines (by accessing its own memory addresses
mapped to it) i.e., he flushes the Spy’s data off the cache. To
transmit bit “0”, the Trojan lets the cache in the same state by
doing nothing.
A set-associative cache is divided in sets of cache lines.
As shown in Figure 3, a memory address can be splitted into
{TAG, SET, OFFSET} bits where OFFSET is the offset in
the cache line, SET the set number and TAG the stored value
to compare addresses. In a w-way set-associative cache, w
addresses mapped to the same cache line can be stored at the
same time, generally based on a LRU replacement policy.
As a result, w addresses must be accessed to fully flush
one w-way cache line.
Furthermore, virtual to physical address translation rises
the problem of addressing uncertainty. Nonetheless, in modern
operating systems, the memory space is divided in 4 KB
pages and the translation mechanism maps a virtual page to a
Fig. 2. Cached-based timing covert channel transmitting ”10”.
Fig. 3. Memory address cache line and page mapping.
physical page. Thus, as illustrated in Figure 3, the last 12 bits
of a memory address remain identical after the translation,
leaving unknownsets possible cache sets for one virtual
memory address where :
unknownsets =
nbsets× linesize
pagesize
(1)
Therefore, to evict a Spy’s cache line, the Trojan accesses at
least minlines addresses where:
minlines = w × unknownsets (2)
Given the total cache size is ttsize = w× nbsets× linesize,
to read or transmit a single bit the trojan accesses at least:
minlines =
ttsize
pagesize
(3)
Finally, we suppose the same probability to transmit bit ”0” or
bit ”1” i.e., P (0) = P (1) = 1/2. Thus, the final time to read
or write a bit is:
(latencycached + latencyflushed)
2
× ttsize
pagesize
(4)
B. Discussion
Previous works on covert timing channels are mainly based
on experimental results. To our knowledge, our paper is the
first attempt to generalize the computation of cache-based
covert timing channel bitrate. For this generalization, we con-
sider the time between writing and reading to be null whereas
experimental approaches must implement a synchronization
mechanism. Indeed, there is a vast range of possibilities for this
synchronization between the Trojan and the Spy, and choosing
one would alter the quality of our metric. Moreover, this
synchronization can be achieved independently from the attack
itself. For example, in side channels works, the question is to
detect when a cache activity corresponds to a cryptographic
computation. If the victim is a web server, a simple solution
is to trigger it by accessing a SSL-encrypted web page.
Secondly, our information leakage metric can only be based
on known covert timing channel attacks, thus it encompasses
neither unknown existing attacks nor yet-to-discover attack
schemes. However, this metric does not rely on execution
traces and as so, it applies to any application and, if properly
adapted, any hardware. For example, atomic memory oper-
ations are improperly emulated in x86 virtualized environ-
ment [21]. These atomic operations have been implemented
with a big system lock (a lock that freezes all other activities
of the system) to keep the memory consistent. Consequently,
a memory contention generated by one VM can be seen
by another one running on the same physical machine. By
observing a contention or its absence, the Trojan and the Spy
can transmit respectively bit “1” or “0”.
IV. INFORMATION LEAKAGE AWARE PLACEMENT
This paper focuses on the placement of VMs with informa-
tion leakage constraints specified as isolation properties. What
we want to demonstrate is the effectiveness of our approach to
ensure isolation and what to consider when doing placement-
based security i.e., how to enhance state of the art algorithms
to take into account these constraints. In this section we present
how isolation properties are satisfied (i.e., enforced) during
the placement routine. Moreover, we describe the problem of
NUMA allocation and show how we tackle this issue. Finally,
we prove the NP-completeness of our placement problem.
A. Isolation Properties Satisfaction
A placement is the association between a VM and a
configuration. We define a configuration as a set of NUMAs
and cores. By instantiated VMs, we denote the VMs placed on
a physical machine (on a set of NUMAs and cores).
A candidate VM’s configuration is valid if both following
conditions are met:
1) All properties of the candidate VM are satisfied
regarding instantiated VMs.
2) All properties of instantiated VMs are satisfied re-
garding the candidate VM.
An isolation property of a first VM vm1 is satisfied regard-
ing a second VM vm2 if one of the 2 following conditions is
met:
1) vm2 is allowed to transfer information with vm1
2) the information leakage between their configurations
is lower than the one specified by the property (as an
acceptable risk).
These 2 requirements on top of the hardware ones must
be fulfilled to find a suitable configuration. Furthermore, to be
able to ensure that all the VMs are respecting their isolation
properties (and the ones of the others) during their whole
lifetime, it is important to use CPU pinning i.e., to statically
associate VMs with cores. Indeed, by not doing so (i.e., if we
let a VM changes core during its lifetime or randomly selects
one at startup), one of the isolation property could be broken
and so the security of the application running inside it as the
configuration of the VM would have changed.
Accordingly, our security-aware algorithm must test all
configurations for a VM on the physical machines and place
it as soon as a configuration is valid. Moreover the placement
routine must update the available resources of the platform.
Actually, this update is more complex than it seems due to
the way NUMA allocation works. In the following part, we
present the NUMA allocation problem and the solution we
propose.
B. The NUMA allocation problem
We must consider real-world microarchitectural alloca-
tion schemes to counter real-world microarchitectural attacks
(covert channels). Therefore, our proposal is to have a fine-
grained control over which (microarchitectural) component is
shared amongst multiple VMs to mitigate potential covert
channels. With libvirt1, in addition to the selection of specific
cores, we can choose a set of NUMA nodes and one of the 3
available memory allocation policies:
• interleave that allocates memory on a given set of
NUMA nodes in a round-robin fashion but falls back
to other nodes if the allocation is not possible. In the
worst case, any NUMA node can be allocated.
• strict that only allocates memory on a given set of
NUMA nodes (or it fails).
• preferred that allocates memory on a given preferred
node but falls back to other nodes if the allocation is
not possible. In the worst case, any NUMA node can
be allocated.
We use the strict policy to have a fine-grained control over
memory allocation as we have for CPU cores.
Figure 4 illustrates how the strict NUMA allocation works.
We consider a physical machine composed of 2 NUMA nodes
with 2 Gb memory and 2 cores each. A first VM (1 core, 1 Gb
memory) is bound to the core c1 and the closest NUMA node
(i.e., the memory banks are directly connected to the core),
Numa1. A second VM requiring 3 cores is bound to c2, c3, c4
which are spread on the 2 NUMA nodes. If this VM requires 2
Gb memory, allocating memory from Numa2 is enough. But
if 3 Gb memory are required, both Numa1 and Numa2 are
chosen.
In terms of microarchitectural attacks, the information
leakage between the 2 VMs is simply the bandwidth leakage
between their bound cores and NUMAs.
Fig. 4. Strict memory allocation policy for 2 VMs (1 core then 3 cores).
1The API for managing the virtualization layer on Linux: http://libvirt.org/
Figure 5 illustrates our proposal to deal with the memory
segmentation. The first VM (3 cores and 3 Gb of memory) is
bound on both Numa1 and Numa2 because it requires more
than 2 Gb. The problem is that there is no indication on how
much memory will be left on Numa1 and Numa2, a total of
1 Gb memory being free though. As a result, the second VM
requiring 1 core and 1 Gb memory is also bound to Numa1
and Numa2. Our solution is to virtually consider the merging
of Numa1 and Numa2, that is Numa1,2 which has a total
memory of 4 Gb, 1 Gb being free after the placement of the
first VM.
Then, in terms of microarchitectural attacks, the in-
formation leakage between the 2 VMs is the band-
width leakage between {c1, c2, c3, Numa1, Numa2} and
{c4, Numa1, Numa2}.
Fig. 5. Strict memory allocation policy for 2 VMs (3 cores then 1 core).
Our NUMA allocation procedure works as follows. Upon
a new memory allocation request, we select a set of NUMAs
numas in the list of available NUMAs such as there is
enough memory to allocate. If numas contains more than
1 NUMA, we merge them and create a new virtual NUMA
nnew, set nnew available memory properly, and finally we
replace numas from the list available NUMAs with nnew.
Otherwise (numas is a singleton), we just update numas
available memory.
In the desallocation procedure, we delete a virtual NUMA
if and only if there is no more VM allocated on it. When it
is the case, we put the merged NUMAs back in the list of
available NUMAs.
Our security-aware allocation is not rendering the place-
ment problem less complex. Indeed, VM placement (and
any placement problem) is know to be NP-hard and can be
abstracted as bin-packing problem. In the next subsection, we
prove that our extension actually increase the complexity of
solving the placement problem.
C. Complexity of our allocation problem
Let an infinity of cores with the VM deployment capacity
C. Let a list of virtual machine {vm1,1, vm1,2, . . . , vmn,n}.
We can split this set of virtual machines, in different sub-set:
{vm1,1, vm1,2, . . . , vm1,n} with a size cn, {vm2,1, vm2,2}
with a size c2, and so on. We want pack objects of different
volumes (here a sub-set of VMs) into a finite number of bins
(here cores) each of volume C in a way that minimizes the
number of bins (/cores) used.
We use the binary code to describe the solution and indicate
if a VM is on a core or not. Variable xij is egal to 1 if the
VM i is deployed on the core j, and 0 otherwise. Boolean
variable yj is egal to 1 if the core is used, 0 otherwise. We try
to minimize the number of core used.
min
n∑
j=1
yj (5)
This problem is known as the NP-hard problem called the Bin
Packing Problem (BPP). Nevertheless, in our case we have
additional constraints due to the security rules. We can con-
sider these constraints like conflicts. The Bin-Packing Problem
with Conflicts is called BPPC. It consists in determining the
minimal number of identically bins (/cores) needed to store a
set of items (VMs) with height is less than the capacity of bins
(/cores), where some of this items are incompatible with each
other (isolation rules), therefore cannot be packed together in
the same bin (/core). The BPPC is a variation of the classical
one dimensional BPP which is a combinatorial problem and
known also to be NP-hard [4], [9]. Finally, our problem is even
harder as we do not have 1 dimension (core) but 2 (memory
and core). To keep the proof of concept simple, we rely on a
first-fit heuristic to solve this BPPC problem.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our security-aware framework
on a 3-tier use case using the information leakage metric
previously introduced. A 3-tier application delivers a service
(most of the time, a website) that is composed of 3 main
parts: a frontend server (e.g., Apache), an application server
(e.g., Tomcat) and a database (e.g., MySQL). In this section,
we consider a 3-tier application composed of 1 frontend VM,
2 application VMs and 1 database VM. Each of these VMs
requires 1 core. Firstly, we present our testbed platform. Then,
we detail the scenarios we use in our evaluation. Finally,
we demonstrate that a security-oblivious placement algorithm
breaks a fair amount of isolation properties but taking them
into account impacts the acceptance rate (i.e., the percentage
of successfully placed submissions).
A. Testbed platform
We consider an heterogeneous platform of a hundred physi-
cal machines. We define 2 types of existing physical machines,
namely Taurus and Genepi from the Grid’5000 experimental
platform [1]. In order to compute the cache-based timing covert
channel bandwidth, we use the hwloc [2] tool to obtain Taurus
and Genepi hardware topology.
We observe that Taurus has a shared L3 cache of 15
MB and Genepi has a shared L2 cache of 6144 KB. Then
we compute the cache latencies using lat mem rd from the
lmbench [10] benchmarks suite presented in Figure 6.
From Taurus latency measures, we can identify 4 steps,
that is 1.43ns from 1 B to 32 KB (L1 cache), 4.3ns from 32
KB to 256 KB (L2 cache), 17.0ns from 256 KB to 15 MB
(L3 cache). Taurus RAM latency is 108ns on local NUMA
and 184.5ns on remote NUMA.
From Genepi latency measures, we can identify 3 steps,
that is 1.2ns from 1 B to 32 KB (L1 cache), 6.3ns from 32
KB to 6144 KB (L2 cache), and 130.0ns above (RAM).
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Fig. 6. Taurus (with NUMAs) and Genepi memory read latencies.
Finally, using Equation 4, Taurus L3 cache-based timing
covert channel can transmit one bit in 0.5× (17ns+108ns)×
15MB/4KB = 240.0µs i.e., 4.167 Kbps bitrate on local
NUMA, and 0.5 × (17ns + 184.5ns) × 15MB/4KB =
386.9µs i.e., 2.585 Kbps bitrate on remote NUMA.
Identically, Genepi L2 cache-based timing covert chan-
nel can transmit one bit in 0.5 × (6.3ns + 130ns) ×
6144KB/4KB = 104.7µs i.e., 9.551 Kbps bitrate.
B. Scenarios
For our placement evaluation, we define 4 security levels,
namely Strong, Medium, Weak and None; their corresponding
bitrates are given in Table II. As we want to observe the impact
of bitrates on the placement (i.e., acceptance rate), these levels
are based on our platform microarchitecture (i.e., Taurus and
Genepi). Determining which levels are relevant to security
requires a thorough study, and thus this question is out of
the scope of this paper. Considering our platform, a VM with
a Strong isolation property cannot share any cache with any
other VM. Similarly, a VM with a Medium Isolation can only
share Taurus’s L3 if memory is allocated on a remote NUMA.
Either a local or a remote allocation is possible with a Weak
Isolation. Finally, only the None security level allows VMs to
share Genepi’s L2 cache.
TABLE II. SECURITY LEVEL AND ASSOCIATED BITRATES
Security Level bitrate (B)
Strong B < 2.585Kbps
Medium 2.585Kbps ≤ B < 4.167Kbps
Weak 4.167Kbps ≤ B < 9.717Kbps
None B > 9.717Kbps
It is reasonable to admit that a tenant considers other
tenant’s VMs as a bigger threat than its own VMs. Therefore,
we define a two-fold policy where internal refers to the
security level between the 4 VMs of an application, and
external refers to the security level with other VMs in the
Cloud.
C. Placement Results
Our objective is to analyze (1) the risk, in terms of
unsatisfied security rules, of a security-agnostic algorithm as
implemented in current Cloud platforms, and (2) the accep-
tance rate with our security-aware algorithm which guarantee
the satisfaction of all rules.
In this evaluation, we consider all internal/external security
level combinations with the internal level always weaker (or
equal) than the external one.
We simulate a platform that is composed of 50 Genepi
physical machines and 50 Taurus physical machines for a
total of 1000 cores. We evaluate the submission of 250 3-
tier applications requiring a total of 1,000 cores (i.e., 4 VMs
× 250 apps.) to saturate the platform.
We evaluate 2 First-Fit algorithms:
• security-agnostic (sec-agnostic FF). It does not try to
verify any security rules and so will always have a
100% acceptance rate.
• security-aware (sec-aware FF). It must satisfy all rules
and so will always have 0% of unsatisfied rules.
The results presented in Table III show that not consid-
ering security (i.e., sec-agnostic FF) exposes a non-negligible
number of instantiated applications to covert channels attacks.
Even with light constraints like Medium/None some VMs are
still insecure (15% of unsatisfied rules) whereas sec-aware FF
is able to place 100% of the submissions.
On the other hand, strict security policies come at great
expenses. For example the Strong/Strong scenario can only
achieve 30% acceptance rate. A future work will be to budget
an application according to its security constraints. These first
results gives us an overlook of the trade-offs induced by
security levels.
TABLE III. FIRSTFIT PLACEMENT RESULTS
Scenario sec-agnostic FF sec-aware FF
External Internal (% of unsatisfied rules) (acceptance rate in %)
Strong Strong 100 30
Strong Medium 65 60
Strong Weak 50 60
Strong None 30 80
Medium Medium 50 80
Medium Weak 35 80
Medium None 15 100
Weak Weak 20 80
Weak None 0 100
None None 0 100
Due to our simulation setup (platform and submissions),
all acceptance rates obtained with sec-aware FF are optimal.
It would not be the case for heterogeneous inputs though. The
proof is quite simple. In short, with the Medium and Weak
levels, 100% of Taurus cores can be allocated if using a remote
NUMA, that is 12 cores. For Genepi physical machines, the
Medium/Weak levels only allow one core per L2 to be allocated
out of 2. As a result, only half of the cores can be allocated on
Genepi physical machines i.e., 4 cores. We obtain (12 cores +
4 cores) × 50 physical machines = 800 cores for 1000 available
cores, and thus the 80% acceptance rate obtained with a First
Fit is optimal for Medium and Weak levels. The proof is similar
for other levels, and thus the design of other security-aware
algorithms would be relevant only for a more heterogeneous
setup where First Fit is not optimal. As we want to focus on
a proof-of-concept in this paper, the study of other algorithms
is part of our future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even with perfect information flow control mechanisms,
virtualized environments are still sensitive to silent information
leakage, that is covert channels, due to shared hardware
ressources. This paper proposes a fine-grained placement based
on the tenant’s isolation properties to tackle this issue. The
tenant submits an application i.e., a set of VMs, and he defines
foreach VM the acceptable risk in isolation properties, with
respect to other VMs. Due to the lack of usable covert channel
metric to qualify an acceptable risk, this paper proposes a new
information leakage metric and demonstrates how to compute
it with the example of a cache-based timing covert chan-
nel. As covert channels exploit microarchitecture flaws, we
integrate the specificity of NUMA allocation schemes in our
placement algorithm. Furthermore, this paper outlines the risk-
factor of traditional placement algorithms while demonstrating
the feasability of taking into account information leakage
constraints.
This work is a proof-of-concept for placement-based se-
curity. This paper covers VM isolation constraints on mi-
croarchitectural components. A next step will be to apply our
approach to networking. Combining computing and network-
ing resources, designing efficient provisioning algorithms for
arbitrary Cloud applications is part of our future work. Inde-
pendently, an open issue is how to define what is an acceptable
risk for real-world tenant’s specifications. Finally, we have
shown the trade-off between infrastructure consolidation and
security requirements. A perspective is to propose a model for
the Cloud provider to charge these security requirements.
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